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Sub-Saharan African countries. As our proxy for democracy we first use the democracy 
index constructed by Freedom House and then check the sensitivity of our findings using, 
as an alternative proxy for democracy, the Legislative Index of Electoral Competitiveness 
(LIEC). We find support for the Lipset hypothesis - in the long run, real GDP Granger 
causes democracy and an increase in GDP results in an improvement in democracy - in 
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DOES DEMOCRACY FACILITATE ECONOMIC GROWTH OR DOES ECONOMIC 




There has been a surge of interest in the relationship between democracy and economic 
growth in recent times. Economists have focused on the effect of democracy on economic 
growth, while political scientists have studied the effect of economic growth on 
democracy. This interest reflects, at least partly, that the relationship between democracy 
and economic growth is contentious. While some studies have found that democracy has 
a positive effect on economic growth, other studies suggest a negative relationship or no 
relationship at all. Similarly, although most studies have found that economic growth has 
a positive effect on democracy, there is no consensus on this issue, particularly at low 
levels of economic development. While democracy is sometimes equated with the right to 
vote (Cheung, 1998, p. 247), here we define it more broadly than whether a country has 
elections. We follow the definition given by Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (2002, pp. 
135–136) who stated: “Democracy … [extends to] whether a country has checks and 
balances on executive powers, constitutional processes and guarantees, freedom of the 
press and the absence of censorship, clear and effective judicial and legal structures, 
incumbent term limits, and transparency, openness and citizen input in policymaking”.  
 
This paper considers the democracy-growth nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). While 
there have been a few exceptions, such as Botswana, SSA has generally had a poor record 
of economic growth, dating back over a long period of time. Between 1980 and 1990, 
average annual growth in real GDP per capita was -0.65%; between 1990 and 1994, it 
was -2.2% and between 1995 and 1999 it was 0.4% (Fosu, 2001). Several reasons have   3
been offered for SSA’s poor economic performance including high population growth, 
poor export performance, low levels of human capital, inefficiencies in the public sector 
and ethnic conflicts (World Bank 1984, 1990; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Schatz, 1994).  
 
Several studies have considered the effect of political variables on economic growth in 
SSA (Ghura, 1995; Ojo and Oshikoya, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Guillaumont et 
al.,  1999). Other studies have examined the effect of political instability on savings 
(Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor, 1996) or investment (Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor, 
1999) in SSA. Political instability, in particular, has been found to be an important reason 
for the observed low growth of SSA (Guillaumont et al., 1999). However, a problem with 
most existing studies that have tested for a correlation between democracy and economic 
growth, including those on the democracy-growth relationship in SSA, is that they fail to 
adequately address the issue of causation. And this limitation of past research is 
important given that the direction of causation is in dispute. The concept of Granger 
causality provides a useful tool with which to examine the democracy-growth nexus and 
simultaneously test the economic and political science hypotheses. Granger causality has 
been widely used in other contexts; however, with a few exceptions (Burkhart and Lewis-
Beck, 1994; Glasure et al., 1999; Campos and Nugent, 1999), it has not been used to 
examine the causal relationship between democracy and economic growth. 
 
This paper makes three contributions to the literature on democracy and economic growth 
in SSA. First, for 30 SSA countries, using time series data we test for a long-run 
relationship between democracy and economic growth using the bounds testing 
procedure to cointegration, based on an unrestricted error correction model developed by   4
Pesaran and others (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran et al., 2001). The major 
advantage of using the bounds testing approach to cointegration over the alternatives for 
our purposes is that it can be used irrespective of the order of integration of the variables, 
and it has superior properties in finite samples, compared with other methods. We utilize 
exact critical values for the bounds test that are specific to our sample size. The second 
contribution is that for those countries where we find cointegration, we estimate the long-
run elasticities. We use three estimators: fully modified ordinary least squares (OLS) 
(Phillips and Hansen, 1990), Dynamic OLS (Stock and Watson, 1993) and Engle and 
Granger (1987) OLS to provides a check on the robustness of our findings. Third, we 
examine the existence, and direction, of long-run and short-run Granger causality.  
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. The next section provides an overview 
of the competing hypotheses in the existing literature on the relationship democracy and 
economic growth. Section 3 sets out the econometric approach and presents the findings 
from the study. Section 4 summarizes the findings using the alternative measures of 
democracy. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 contains the conclusion.  
 
2. Competing Hypotheses on the Democracy-Growth Nexus 
There are three major theses concerning the effects of democracy on growth that have 
been dubbed the “conflict”, the “compatibility” and the “skeptical” hypotheses (Sirowy 
and Inkeles, 1990). The conflict hypothesis proposes that democracy and economic 
growth are incompatible. One reason suggested for this incompatibility is that elected 
officials will make myopic decisions designed to maximize their electoral success 
(Comeau, 2003). This behaviour makes officials vulnerable to the overtures of rent-
seeking interest groups (Krueger, 1974) and special interest politics (Olson, 1982), such   5
as the labour unions whose demands will cut into entrepreneurs’ profits and slow the rate 
of economic growth (Gupta et al., 1998). In contrast, the conflict hypothesis proposes that 
authoritarian regimes are insulated from redistributive politics, which allows them to 
enact policies conducive to long-term growth (Comeau, 2003). Moreover, as the residual 
claimants of their countries’ wealth, dictators have an interest in furthering growth to 
increase their share of national income (McGuire and Olson, 1996). 
 
A second argument made by advocates of the conflict hypothesis is that democracy is less 
conducive to long term stability (World Bank, 1991, pp. 131–132) or to long-term 
development (Barro, 1996), given the proclivity of majority voting systems to legislate 
for redistribution of income, including land reforms, from the rich to the poor. Cheung 
(1998) put forward a third argument that corruption is more likely to flourish under 
democracy than dictatorship. The rationale for Cheung’s position is that in an 
authoritarian regime, “people on top want to maintain their hold on power and corruption 
is one thing that will most likely destroy this. The cost of corruption is high for dictators. 
But if someone is elected into office, because power is transient there is an incentive to 
go on the take” (Cheung, 1998, p. 248). Cheung’s view, however, overlooks subtleties 
between regime types. Corruption can exist in both democracies and dictatorships. In 
addition, there is no consensus about the effects of corruption on economic growth. Some 
studies have found that corruption reduces growth (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001). However, 
other studies conclude that corruption has desirable properties for growth (Acemoglu and 
Verdier, 1998). The latter perspective suggests that corruption can act as a lubricant that 
reduces transaction costs and therefore increases the efficiency of the economy. 
   6
The compatibility hypothesis provides the opposite view to the conflict hypothesis. First, 
it suggests that political pluralism and institutional checks and balances are necessary to 
protect against systemic abuse or predatory behaviour, which are often associated with 
authoritarian regimes. According to North (1993), “well specified and enforced property 
rights, a necessary condition for economic growth, are only secure when political and 
civil rights are secure; otherwise arbitrary confiscation is always a threat”. Second, in 
contrast with the argument made for the conflict hypothesis, it is suggested that 
democratization might limit rent seeking due to its system of checks and balances (de 
Haan and Sturm, 2003). This view builds on Rodrik’s (2000) argument that democratic 
institutions can be viewed as the ultimate institutions for conflict management as they 
allow for differences among social groups to be resolved in a predictable, inclusive and 
participatory manner. The compatibility hypothesis is consistent with the view that 
economic and political freedoms are mutually reinforcing (Friedman, 1962). While there 
is nothing in principle preventing non-democratic governments from promoting economic 
freedoms (Barro, 1996), the compatibility hypothesis suggests that democracy is more 
conducive to promoting economic freedoms and growth than authoritarianism because 
the political legitimacy of a democracy depends on maintaining economic rights. 
 
The intermediate position is the skeptical hypothesis which proffers that there is no 
systematic relationship between democracy and economic growth. What really matters is 
the effectiveness of policies implemented and the stability of the regime, rather than its 
type (Comeau, 2003). Clague et al. (1996) suggested that there can be growth enhancing 
democracies and growth-enhancing dictatorships and that the quality of economic 
policies depends on the time horizon of the dictator in autocracies and whether the   7
democratic system is durable in democracies. Their empirical findings suggest that 
autocrats who have been in power for some time provide better contractual and property 
rights than autocrats who have been in power a shorter period. 
 
Advocates of the skeptical hypothesis argue that while it might generally be true that 
there is more economic freedom under a democracy than under authoritarianism, there is 
no guarantee that there will be an optimal outcome (Esposto and Zaleski, 1999). 
Democracies contain those whose aim is to challenge the private property status quo 
where it is in their best interests. Cheung (1998, p. 247) suggested: “If you look at the 
things people in the so-called democratic countries are voting on, in the absence of a 
well-defined constitution, the core issues generally involve infringement of property 
rights, which in turn undermine the system of private enterprise”. Moreover, the very 
nature of a democracy, with its emphasis on political freedom, creates more opportunities 
for such challenges to property rights (Przeworki and Limongi, 1993). 
 
There is mixed empirical support for each of the hypotheses. This led Przeworki and 
Limongi (1993, p. 64) to conclude: “We do not know whether democracy fosters or 
hinders growth”. There is some evidence to suggest that political freedom has facilitated 
economic liberalisation in Central and Eastern Europe (De Melo et al. 1996, 1997; 
Dethier et al., 1997). The balance of empirical evidence, however, seems to be with the 
conflict and skeptical views rather than the compatibility view. This is interesting in light 
of the fact that the literature on the political economy of SSA seems to have developed a 
consensus that rejects the conflict hypothesis, even if there is no clear support for the 
compatibility hypothesis (see Feng, 1996). Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) surveyed thirteen   8
studies of the democracy-growth nexus, six of which supported the skeptical view, four 
of which suggested qualified or conditional relationships, and three of which provided 
unconditional support for the conflict perspective. Borner et al. (1995) reported that of 16 
empirical studies, three suggest a positive relationship and three a negative relationship 
between democracy and economic growth, and the other 10 are inconclusive. Brunetti 
(1997) examined 17 studies and found (p. 167) “nine studies report no relationship, one 
study a positive, one study a negative, three studies a fragile negative relationship and 
three studies a fragile positive relationship between democracy and economic growth”. 
 
While economists have been primarily concerned with the effect of democracy on 
economic growth, political scientists have focused on the implications of economic 
growth for increased levels of political freedom. Most studies have found that economic 
growth results in more demands for political freedom (Lipset, 1959; Bollen, 1979; Bollen 
and Jackman, 1985; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Barro, 1996). Barro (1996) has 
termed this the Lipset hypothesis. Glasure et al. (1999) also found that in developing 
countries and newly industrialising countries, economic development has a significant 
effect on democratic performance, but contrary to Lipset et al. (1959), economic 
development leads to lower levels of democracy. Glasure et al. (1999, p. 475) concluded: 
“The sign reversal may stem from the possibility that as nations strive for economic 
development, the nations tend to trade-off democracy for economic development”. 
 
3. Empirical Study 
3.1 The Data 
We use data on real GDP and democracy [ ] D , Y  for 30 SSA countries, as classified by 
the World Bank, for the period 1972–2001. All analyses are conducted in natural logs so   9
the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The series on nominal GDP and the 
GDP deflator were extracted from the World Bank World Tables. Using the GDP 
deflator, nominal GDP was converted into real GDP. The time frame for the study was 
dictated by data availability. While data on GDP are available from the World Bank for 
most of the countries from 1960, the democracy data are only available from 1972. The 
democracy data were extracted from Freedom House (Gastil et al., 1972–2001). Freedom 
House constructs their democracy indexes with the assistance of local and international 
printed materials, field visits and other communications with informed observers. 
Following a checklist of various components of democracy, countries are assigned a 
value for political rights between one (most free) and seven (least free).  
 
We use the Freedom House scores on their unaltered 1-7 scale, rather than creating a 
dummy variable as in some previous studies. (For a recent study which uses the same 
approach as we do, see Comeau, 2003). According to Comeau, the advantage of using the 
original scale is twofold. First, it conveys more information. The availability of seven 
classes to rank countries gives the survey more flexibility to capture subtleties in 
differences in the level of democracy across countries. In a time series framework, this 
makes it easier to take account of moderate fluctuations in political freedoms on a year to 
year basis. Second, it is easier to interpret because there is no need to decipher the 
corresponding Freedom House score of a freedom level expressed in a dummy variable. 
 
3.2 Order of Integration of the Variables 
In contrast to most cointegration tests, the bounds test for cointegration does not require a 
priori knowledge of the integration properties of the variables. However, all variables 
need to be integrated of order one ( ( ) 1 I ) for the application for two of the three long-run   10
estimators we use; namely, the Phillips and Hansen (1990) fully modified OLS and the 
Engle and Granger (1987) OLS method. The variables also need to be integrated of the 
same order to conduct Granger causality tests. Given these requirements, to ascertain the 
order of integration we apply the Augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) and Phillips and 
Perron (PP) unit root tests. Both these unit root procedures test the null hypothesis of a 
single unit root against the alternative hypothesis that the series is stationary. 
---------------------- 
Insert Table 1 
------------------- 
Table 1 reports the results of the unit root tests. In Table 1  Y ln  is the natural log of real 
income and  D ln  is the natural log of the democracy variable. The order of integration of 
the variables is given in the last two columns of Table 1. The tests produced similar 
results. When the ADF and PP tests suggest different results (for the democracy variable 
in Burundi, Kenya, Ghana, Mauritius and Zimbabwe and the income variable for Chad, 
Mauritius and Togo), the PP results are preferred because of their generally greater power 
(see Banerjee et al., 1993, p.113). There are 17 countries (Botswana, Benin, Burundi, 
Central Africa, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Ghana, Rwanda, Republic of 
Congo, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe and Nigeria) where both the democracy 
and income variables are  () 1 I , seven countries (Gabon, Gambia, Malawi, Burkina Faso, 
South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia) where the democracy variable is  () 1 I  and the 
income variable is  () 0 I  and five countries (Cameroon, Chad, Lesotho, Mauritius and 
Sierra Leone) where the income variable is  ( ) 1 I  and the democracy variable is  () 0 I  at the 
5% level or better. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the democracy variable is  ( ) 1 I , 
while the income variable is integrated of order 2 or I(2).   11
 
3.3. Cointegration 
As indicated above, to examine whether there is long-run relationship between 
democracy and real GDP for the 30 SSA countries, we employed the bounds testing 
approach to cointegration. The bounds testing approach to cointegration involves 
estimating conditional error-correction models, treating democracy and real GDP, in turn, 
as the dependent variable. The F-test is applied to each conditional error-correction 
model to ascertain the existence of one or more long-run relationships. While the 
distribution of the F-statistic is non-standard, Pesaran et al. (2001) reported two sets of 
critical values, which are based on 40,000 replications of a stochastic simulation. This 
provides critical value bounds for all classifications of the regressors into purely ( ) 1 I,  
purely  () 0 I  or mutually cointegrated for a sample size of 1000 observations.
1  
 
However, in this study, we only have a relatively small sample size of 30 observations. 
Thus, the relevant critical values were extracted from Narayan (2005). We estimated a 
model which included an intercept, but no trend. If the computed F statistics falls outside 
the critical bounds, a conclusive decision can be made regarding cointegration without 
knowing the order of integration of the regressors. If the estimated F  statistic is higher 
than the upper bound of the critical values then the null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
rejected. If the estimated F  statistic is less than the lower bound of the critical values 
then the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. 
----------------- 
Insert Table 2 
------------------   12
The calculated F-statistics, together with the exact critical values are reported in Table 2. 
Our results indicate that of the 30 countries in our sample, real GDP and democracy are 
cointegrated for only nine countries (Botswana, Gabon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Rwanda, and Nigeria) at the 10% level or better; 
of which, for three (Gabon, Nigeria and Rwanda), there is cointegration only when real 
GDP is treated as the dependent variable and for five (Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Kenya and Niger) there is cointegration only when democracy is 
treated as the dependent variable. However, for Botswana there are two long run 
relationships, meaning that democracy and real GDP are cointegrated when real GDP is 
the dependent variable and when democracy is the dependent variable.  
 
3.4. Long Run Estimators 
To estimate the long run elasticities for the relationship between democracy and real GDP 
where appropriate, we used three different estimators: Engle and Granger (1987) OLS, 
Phillips and Hansen (1990) fully modified OLS and the Stock and Watson (1993) 
dynamic OLS. We used more than one estimator to provide a check that our results are 
not contingent on the technique employed. This also provides a check of the robustness of 
our results. The Engle and Granger (1987) OLS involves estimating the cointegration 
relationship between the two variables  Y ln  and  D ln  using the regression models: 
t t 1 0 t D ln Y ln ξ + η + η =  and                     (1) 
t t 1 0 t Y ln D ln τ + χ + χ =                  ( 2 )  
Here, all variables are as defined previously. The long run elasticity of interest is  1 η  and 
1 χ . The estimator advocated by Stock and Watson (1993) involves estimation of long-run 
equilibria via dynamic OLS. This has the advantage that it corrects for potential   13
simultaneity bias among regressors. It entails regressing one of the  ( ) 1 I  variables on other 
() 1 I  variables, the  () 0 I  variables, and lags and leads of the first difference of the  ( ) 1 I  
variables. The rationale for incorporating the first difference variables and the associated 
lags and leads is to obviate simultaneity bias and small sample bias inherent among 
regressors. Standard hypothesis testing can be undertaken using robust standard errors 
derived via the procedure recommended by Newey and West (1987).
2  
 
The fully modified OLS (FMOLS) procedure, developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990), 
has two direct advantages. Apart from correcting for endogeneity and serial correlation, it 
also asymptotically eliminates the sample bias. There are two conditions considered 
essential to implement the FMOLS. First, there must only be one cointegrating vector. 
Secondly, the explanatory variables must not be cointegrated among themselves.
3  
 
The long run elasticities when GDP is the dependent variable and when democracy is the 
dependent variable are presented in the last three columns of Table 2. Note that because 
the Phillips and Hansen (1990) approach can only be applied where there is a single long-
run relationship, we do not use it for Botswana. Similarly, because the Engle-Granger 
(1987) and Phillips and Hansen (1990) long-run estimators require both variables to be 
() 1 I  where the bounds test suggests there is cointegration but this condition is not 
satisfied, we only report the results from the Stock and Watson (1993) dynamic OLS. 
 
We begin by looking at those countries for which there is a long run relationship between 
real GDP and democracy when real GDP is the dependent variable. For Botswana and 
Rwanda we found that a 1% improvement in democracy leads to a 0.6-1.0% and 1.73-
1.95% increase in real GDP respectively, while in Gabon and Nigeria a 1% improvement   14
in democracy leads to a 0.41 and 0.35% fall in real GDP, respectively. However, note 
that the results for Nigeria are not robust because only the dynamic OLS long-run 
estimator gives a statistically significant result. 
 
Next we looked at the long run elasticities for those countries when democracy is the 
dependent variable. In Botswana, Chad and Niger an increase in GDP results in an 
improvement in democracy, but for Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we 
found that an increase in real GDP has a negative effect on democracy. For Kenya the 
coefficient on real GDP is between 0.23 and 0.41, implying that a 1% increase in real 
GDP leads to a 0.23-0.41 % deterioration in democracy. 
 
3.5. Granger Causality 
To test Granger causality for the thirteen countries where both variables are found to be 
() 1 I , we use a vector autoregression (VAR) model for those countries for which we could 
not establish a cointegration relationship and a vector error-correction mechanism 
(VECM) framework for those countries for which the variables were cointegrated. The 
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                 (3) 
Here,  Y ln  and  D ln  are as defined above,  1 α  and 2 α  denote constant drifts, () L 1−  is the 
lag operator,  1 − t ECM  represents the one period lagged error-correction term derived from 
the cointegrating vector (this is omitted in the VAR model) and  t 1 ε  and  t 2 ε  are serially   15
independent random errors with mean zero and finite covariance matrix. The optimal lag 
length  p  is chosen on the basis of the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion. 
 
Table 2 reports the results for the short run and long run Granger causality.
4 The t-
statistics on the coefficients of the lagged error-correction terms indicate the significance 
of the long-run causal effects. The F  tests on the explanatory variables indicate the 
significance of the short-run causal effects. Beginning with the long-run results, the 
coefficient on the one period lagged error correction term is statistically significant with a 
negative sign in the real GDP equation for Botswana and Gabon. This result implies that 
for these countries, in the long run, democracy Granger causes real GDP. Turning to the 
democracy equations we find that the coefficient on the one period lagged error 
correction term is statistically significant with a negative sign for Botswana, Chad, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger and Kenya. Thus, we conclude that in the 
long run real GDP Granger causes democracy in these countries. 
 
In terms of the short-run results, democracy is statistically significant in the real GDP 
equation for Botswana, Burundi, Ghana and the Republic of Congo. This implies that in 
the short run democracy Granger causes real GDP in these countries. In the democracy 
equation, we find that income is statistically significant for Senegal and Zimbabwe. This 
implies that in the short run real GDP Granger causes democracy in these countries. For 
the other countries there is neutrality between democracy and real GDP. 
 
 
   16
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis using the Beck et al. (2001) Database 
As a check on the sensitivity of the findings using the Freedom House data on 
democracy, we reconsidered the findings using data from the comparative political 
economy database of political institutions published in the World Bank Economic 
Review (Beck et al., 2001) and downloadable from the World Bank website. This dataset 
has time series data for a range of political variables for the period 1975 to 2000. As our 
measure of democracy we use the LIEC which is one of the broadest measures of 
democracy in the Beck et al. dataset. The LIEC is on a seven point scale where 1 is no 
legislature; 2 is an unelected legislature; 3 is an elected legislature, but only one 
candidate; 4 is an elected legislature where there are multiple candidates from the same 
party; 5 is multiple parties are legal, but only one party won seats; 6 is multiple parties 
did win seats, but the largest party won more than 75% of seats and 7 is multiple parties 
won seats and the largest party won less than 75% of the seats. 
------------------------ 
Insert Tables 3 and 4 
--------------------------- 
Table 3 presents the results of the ADF unit root test for the LIEC and GDP variables for 
each country for 1975 to 2000 and Table 4 presents the findings for the bounds test for 
cointegration, long-run elasticities and Granger causality.
5 The bounds test suggests there 
is a long-run relationship between LIEC and GDP for 13 countries (Madagascar, 
Rwanda, Republic of Congo, Mauritius, Botswana, Gabon, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Niger, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland and Nigeria), which is four more than when 
we use the Freedom House dataset. There are six countries for which there is a long-run   17
relationship between the democracy variable and GDP using the Beck et al. (2001) and 
Freedom House datasets (Botswana, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, Rwanda and Nigeria). 
 
There is long-run Granger causality running from LIEC to GDP in Madagascar, Rwanda, 
Mauritius, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Swaziland. There is long-run Granger 
causality running from GDP to LIEC in Botswana, Gabon, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Niger and Nigeria. There is long-run neutrality between LIEC and GDP when LIEC is the 
dependent variable in Madagascar and the Republic of Congo and long-run neutrality 
between GDP and LIEC when GDP is the dependent variable in Nigeria. An increase in 
LIEC generates an increase in GDP in Madagascar, Rwanda, South Africa and Swaziland 
and a fall in GDP in Nigeria and Sierra Leone. An increase in GDP generates an increase 
in LIEC in Botswana, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire, Madagascar and Niger and a fall in LIEC in 
Nigeria. The results for the long-run elasticities are generally robust across long-run 
estimators, although the coefficient on the long-run variable for Botswana is statistically 
insignificant using dynamic OLS, while the long-run coefficient for Nigeria is only 
statistically significant with dynamic OLS and not with the other two estimators. 
4. Summary and Comparison of the Results 
Table 5 presents a summary and comparison of the results using the Freedom House and 
Beck et al. (2001) datasets for Granger causality and the long-run elasticities. The Lipset 
hypothesis will be supported if, in the long run, real GDP Granger causes democracy and 
an increase in GDP results in an improvement in democracy. There is support for the 
Lipset hypothesis for Botswana and Niger with both datasets, for Chad with the Freedom 
House data only and for Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon with the LIEC dataset only. These   18
results provide strong support for the Lipset hypothesis in Botswana and Niger and mixed 
support for the Lipset hypothesis in Chad, Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon; however, there is no 
support for the Lipset hypothesis in other SSA countries. Taking the two datasets 
together, in addition to Botswana, Niger, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon there are four 
other countries for which either dataset suggests real GDP Granger causes democracy in 
the long run – two with the Freedom House data (Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Kenya) and two with the Beck et al. (2001) data (Cameroon and Nigeria). Of these, in 
Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria, the long-run estimators with the 
relevant data base suggest that an increase in GDP has a negative effect on democracy. 
----------------- 
Insert Table 5 
---------------- 
We now turn to the compatibility, conflict and skeptical hypotheses. There will be 
support for the compatibility hypothesis if, in the long run, democracy Granger causes 
real GDP and an increase in democracy results in an improvement in real GDP. There 
will be support for the conflict hypothesis if, in the long run, democracy Granger causes 
real GDP and an increase in democracy has a negative effect on real GDP. With the 
Freedom House data, the result for Botswana is consistent with the compatibility 
hypothesis and the result for Gabon is consistent with the conflict hypothesis. With the 
Beck  et al. (2001) dataset, the results for Madagascar, Rwanda, South Africa and 
Swaziland are consistent with the compatibility hypothesis and the result for Sierra Leone 
is consistent with the conflict hypothesis. Thus, of those countries where democracy 
Granger causes real GDP in the long run, there is more support for the compatibility 
hypothesis than the conflict hypothesis based on Beck et al.’s (2001) data. However,   19
overall, the small proportion of countries for which democracy Granger causes real GDP 
with either dataset lends support to the skeptical hypothesis that there is no systematic 
relationship between democracy and real GDP for the vast majority of countries. 
 
Why do the results from the two datasets differ, and given that there are relatively few 
countries for which the results overlap, which set of results are more reliable? The LIEC 
database suggests a long-run relationship between democracy and real GDP for more 
countries than the Freedom House database. While the Freedom House and LIEC datasets 
suggest long-run and short-run Granger causality running from real GDP to democracy 
for the same number of countries, the LIEC database suggests democracy Granger causes 
real GDP for a larger number of countries in the long run than the Freedom House data 
while the reverse is true in the short run. A tentative explanation for this result rests with 
the nature of the two datasets. The measurement of democracy in the Beck et al. (2001) 
dataset is based purely on the nature and composition of the legislature, while Freedom 
House considers both political and civil rights in constructing their index. Political rights 
include the right to vote and compete for public office while civil rights include freedom 
to develop opinions, institutions and personal autonomy without interference from the 
state. Of the components of democracy, changes in the nature of the legislature, as a 
fundamental political institution, are likely to have the largest effect on the long-run 
economic growth path. The other factors, such as freedom of the media and right to 
express an opinion, which are captured in the Freedom House data, but not the Beck et al. 
database, are more short-run phenomena and, as such, more subject to change even 
without a change in the nature and composition of the legislature. For example, over a 
period of time a dictatorship might ease restrictions on civil rights allowing a moderate   20
level of freedom of expression and then crack down on civil rights again in response to 
protests for political change. These components of civil rights will have more effect on 
real GDP in the short run. Thus, the LIEC database suggests democracy has a stronger 
effect on real GDP in the long run, while the Freedom House data suggests democracy 
has a stronger effect on real GDP in the short run. 
 
Of the two datasets, we prefer the results from the Freedom House data to the Beck et al. 
(2001) data on both conceptual and statistical grounds. On conceptual grounds, in our 
view, the measurement of democracy in the Freedom House dataset is superior. In 
assigning a value for civil and political rights Freedom House conducts an extensive 
review of primary and secondary sources including consultation with informed observers 
on the ground. While this extensive review process means necessarily that the Freedom 
House ratings are more subjective, they are also more comprehensive as a measure of 
democracy. From a statistical point of view, while the bounds test has superior properties 
in small samples relative to other tests for cointegration, in order to test for long-run 
relationships, it is preferable to have the longest time series possible. The Freedom House 
dataset has a slightly longer duration (1972–2001) than the Beck et al. (2001) dataset 
(1975–2000). Because the Freedom House dataset is more detailed in picking up nuances 
in differences in rights across countries which extend beyond the composition of the 
legislature, it potentially has more variance than the Beck et al. (2001) data. 
5. Discussion of the Results 
In the results using the Freedom House dataset, Botswana stands out as the one country 
where there is support for both the compatibility and Lipset hypotheses, i.e. there is 
bivariate Granger causality between democracy and real GDP in the long run, and   21
democracy and real GDP have a positive effect on each other. The results using the Beck 
et al. (2001) dataset confirm long-run Granger causality running from GDP to democracy 
and that GDP has a positive effect on democracy. These findings suggest that democracy 
and economic growth in Botswana have been complementary and reinforcing. The 
democracy growth nexus is well established in Botswana. The OECD (1999, p. 129) 
posited: “Political stability has resulted from…favourable economic conditions”. While 
this is true, Botswana’s economic success has also been built on a democratic tradition in 
which there are no narrow ethnic-based interest groups with distinct means of expression, 
which has avoided infighting over diamonds and other political issues (Wiseman, 1990). 
 
Botswana has been described as ‘an African success story’ (Acemoglu et al., 2001) with 
the highest growth rate of any country in the world between 1960 and 1999. From 1965 
to 1973 Botswana’s annual rate of growth of GDP was 14.8% which was the highest in 
the world except for the high income oil rich Oman (21.9%). From 1973 to 1984 
Botswana’s annual growth rate was 10.7% which was the highest in the world, 
outstripping Asian Tigers, Hong Kong (9.1%) and Singapore (8.2%) (World Bank, 1986). 
Between 1980 and 1990 Botswana grew at 11%, also the highest in the world over this 
period, with China second at 10.3% per annum. From 1990 to 2003 Botswana’s growth 
slowed to 5.2%, but was still in the top dozen countries in the World Bank World 
Development Indicators list of countries over this period (World Bank, 2005). Botswana 
is one of only a few African countries with a democratic tradition (Wiseman, 1990). It 
has had continuous democracy since obtaining independence in 1966. The discovery of 
diamond mines has facilitated economic growth, but there is more to Botswana’s success 
than simply having abundant natural resources. There is universal agreement that the   22
Botswana government has used the revenue from diamonds to pursue good policies (see 
e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001). The OECD (1999, p. 129) suggested:  
“Unlike many other developing countries facing commodity booms, the 
government maintained conservative economic policies rather than raising its 
spending to unsustainable levels and thus generated economic stability which 
created a favourable environment for domestic and foreign investment”. 
 
Niger is the other country for which there is support for the Lipset hypothesis with both 
datasets. In the post independence period from 1960 to 1974 groundnuts was the leading 
export product, accounting for more than 50% of GDP. Because of severe droughts in 
1968-69 and 1973-74, the role of groundnuts in the agricultural sector collapsed. The 
declining economic performance following the 1973-74 droughts resulted in deteriorating 
governance with the army taking advantage of the economic and social problems 
generated by the drought to launch a coup d’etat in 1974 (Mamadou and Yakoubou, 
2001). After 1975 uranium supplemented groundnuts as Niger’s major export product. 
The uranium boom resulted in real GDP growth of 10.2% per annum between 1976 and 
1979. In the first half of the 1980s uranium export revenues began to fall as a result of a 
decline in the demand and price for uranium. Between 1980 and 1984 real GDP declined 
4% per annum. In the second half of the 1980s a Structural Adjustment Program was 
initiated with assistance from the IMF and World Bank. The main objectives of the 
Structural Adjustment Program were to improve public sector management and economic 
liberalization. As a result of the economic reforms, economic performance improved with 
real GDP growing at 3.5% per annum between 1985 and 1989. Improved economic 
performance acted as an impetus for political reform. Under pressure from the trade   23
unions and civil society, between 1990 and 1993 Niger revised its constitution to allow 
multiple political parties. Piecemeal political reforms occurred throughout the 1990s 
culminating in a coup in 1999 by Daouda Mallam Wanke who established a transitional 
National Reconciliation Council to oversee the drafting of a new constitution with a 
French style semi-presidential system. The electorate approved a new constitution in July 
1999 in a vote judged by international observers to be fair and in November 1999, 
legislative and presidential elections were held (US Department of State, 2004). 
 
For the other results we focus our discussion on the Freedom House results given that we 
have argued they are preferable on conceptual and statistical grounds to the results 
obtained with the LIEC dataset. The results for Chad with the Freedom House data 
support the Lipset hypothesis. Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world with the 
2004 United Nations Human Development Index ranking Chad the 167
th poorest country 
in the world (out of 177 countries). Poor economic conditions contributed to decades of 
civil war and successive coups where those who instigated the coup charged the 
incumbent government with failing to address poor economic and social conditions. In 
this manner disappointing economic results generated political instability and poor 
governance. When Idriss Deby launched a coup in 1990 his reasoning followed previous 
coups, accusing the Habre government of poor economic performance. While Deby has 
taken steps towards the establishment of an electoral democracy since 1990, the elections 
which have been held have not been free with Deby deploying security forces to 
intimidate opposition candidates and the electorate and forestalling widespread 
demonstrations (EIU, 2005). More generally, opposition groups claim that Deby has 
fostered government instability to undermine political accountability and maintain power.   24
As such, democracy in Chad is fledgling at best. Between 1990 and 1998 Chad had five 
prime ministers and 20 governments and one of Deby’s own ministers, Youssef Togoimi, 
abandoned politics in favour of armed struggle (US Department of State, 2004).  
 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya with the Freedom House data Granger 
causes democracy in the long run and an increase in real GDP has a negative effect on 
democracy. In Kenya’s case it can be argued that weaker economic performance has had 
a positive effect on political freedom. Kenya’s economic performance in the 1980s and 
1990s was poor relative to the 1960s and 1970s. In the years following independence 
Kenya achieved rapid economic growth. Between 1963 and 1973 GDP grew at 6.6% per 
annum and agricultural production grew at 4.7% per annum. Over the ensuing two 
decades economic performance has not been as good. Between the mid-1970s and mid-
1990s Kenya had lower growth and limited economic transformation. Between 1975 and 
1979 annual GDP growth was 2.2% per annum; between 1980 and 1984 annual GDP 
growth was -1.8%; between 1985 and 1989 annual GDP growth was 5.8% and between 
1991 and 1995 annual GDP growth was 2.6% (World Bank, 2005). There was an 
elaborate system of state patronage under the Kenyatta regime, but it incorporated the 
leaders of most ethnic groups. At the same time semi-competitive regular elections 
helped to diffuse political conflict. As the OECD (1999a, p. 27) put it: “Provided one 
remained within the party … and did not criticize the President, an individual politician 
had considerable freedom”. In the 1980s Kenya under Moi was a single party state with 
widespread political repression. Following the end of the Cold War with Kenya reliant on 
lending agencies, foreign aid was withheld pending compliance with political reform. 
One of the key conditions imposed on the Moi regime was the restoration of a multiparty   25
democracy. There were elections in the 1990s which were marred by electoral fraud and 
political violence, but which Moi ultimately won because the opposition was divided. 
 
Over the period studied, the Democratic Republic of Congo was a political dictatorship 
under Mobutu and then Kabila. The freedom of the press was curtailed, there was little or 
no tolerance of dissent and it had a poor human rights record (World Press Freedom 
Review, 2003). The findings for the Democratic Republic of Congo are surprising, 
though, in that the lack of democratic institutions did not result from higher economic 
growth because the Democratic Republic of Congo was, and still is, one of the poorest 
countries in the world with annual per capita income of $US90 in 2002 (World Bank, 
2003). The Democratic Republic of Congo does have much mineral wealth, suggesting it 
has considerable potential to increase GDP, but this was poorly managed under the 
Mobutu regime and in the 1990s there was a spill over of civil unrest from the war in 
Rwanda. Causation appeared to run from poor governance to low growth with Mobutu 
imposing prohibitive rates of taxation that acted as disincentives for work and made 
bribery and corruption pervasive and a necessity for private business. Public finances 
were dissipated into private consumption for Mobutu, his family and key offices within 
the state. A vast body of evidence suggests that Mobutu appropriated several hundred 
million dollars annually that belonged to the national treasury (see e.g. Moloki, 1997).  
 
In Gabon the results using the Freedom House index and in Sierra Leone the results using 
the Beck et al. (2001) dataset indicate that long-run Granger causality runs from 
democracy to real GDP and that improvements in democracy have a negative effect on 
real GDP, consistent with the conflict hypothesis. This result is consistent with Collier   26
and Hoeffler’s (2005) findings that in the presence of large rents from natural resources, 
autocracies outperform democracies. Gabon depends on oil reserves and Sierra Leone has 
extensive reserves of non-precious (bauxite, rutile) and precious (diamonds) minerals. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2005) found that in the absence of natural resource rents, a fully 
democratic polity outperforms a despotic autocracy by around 1.5 percentage points of 
growth per annum, but where natural resource rents are around 8% of GDP, in the 
absence of checks and balances, the growth advantage of democracy is eliminated. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the relationship between democracy and real GDP in 30 SSA 
countries using Freedom House data over the period 1972–2001. We checked the 
sensitivity of our findings using the LIEC for the countries from the Beck et al. (2001) 
database for the period 1975-2000. We conclude by reiterating our results for the Lipset 
hypothesis as well as the competing hypotheses concerning the effect on democracy on 
economic growth. There is support for the Lipset hypothesis which proffers that real GDP 
Granger causes democracy and that an increase in real GDP has a positive effect on 
democracy in the long run for Botswana and Niger with both datasets, for Chad with the 
Freedom House data only and for Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon with the LIEC dataset only. 
These results provide strong support for the Lipset hypothesis in Botswana and Niger and 
mixed support for the Lipset hypothesis in Chad, Cote d’Ivoire and Gabon, but no 
support for the Lipset hypothesis in the remaining countries in the sample. In Kenya and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo with the Freedom House data and Nigeria with the 
LIEC dataset real GDP Granger causes democracy in the long run, but the long-run 
estimators indicate that an increase in real GDP has a negative effect on democracy.   27
 
Next, consider the compatibility, conflict and skeptical hypotheses which are competing 
hypotheses concerning the long-run effect of democracy on economic growth. There is 
support for the compatibility hypothesis, which states that in the long run democracy 
Granger causes real income and an increase in democracy has a positive effect on real 
income, for Botswana with the Freedom House dataset and for Madagascar, Rwanda, 
South Africa and Swaziland with the LIEC dataset. There is support for the conflict 
hypothesis, which states that in the long run democracy Granger causes real income and 
an increase in democracy has a negative effect on real income, for Gabon with the 
Freedom House data and Sierra Leone with the LIEC data. However, the fact that for 
most countries there is long run Granger neutrality between democracy and real GDP 
provides support to the skeptical hypothesis for the vast majority of the sample.   28
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Table 1: Unit Root Tests using Freedom House data 
Country  ADF Test   Phillips-Perron Test 
 
t Y ln   t Y ln Δ   t D ln   t D ln Δ   t Y ln   t Y ln Δ   t D ln   t D ln Δ   t D ln   t Y ln  
Benin  -1.9108 [0]  -4.3991 [1]  -1.7193 [0]  -4.0864 [0]  -2.0593 [1]  -4.5857[4]  -1.8405 [0]  -4.0886 [1]  I(1) I(1) 
Botswana  -0.2629 [2]  -3.9216 [1]   -2.4964 [0]  -5.3798 [0]  -2.0838 [1]  -4.5679 [2]  -2.6078 [0]  -5.3798 [0]  I(1) I(1) 
Burkina Faso  -3.1050 [0]  -6.0294 [1]  -2.8122 [0]  -5.1324 [0]  -3.1606 [3]  -8.2286 [3]  -2.8165 [0]  -7.4694 [11]  I(1) I(0) 
Burundi  -0.5602 [0]  -4.3465 [0]  -3.9601 [0]  -6.7907 [0]  -0.7035 [2]  -4.3180 [5]  1.5914 [0]  -3.7124 [6]  I(1) I(1) 
Cameroon  -2.1757 [3]  -3.7420 [0]  -3.9601 [0]  -6.7707 [0]  -1.6512 [3]  -3.7446 [3]  -3.7124 [0]  -15.9138 [23]  I(0) I(1) 
Central Africa  -2.6149 [0]  -5.8948 [0]  -1.8017 [0]  -3.9500 [0]  -2.6149 [0]  -5.9238 [3]  1.8017 [0]  -3.9500 [0]  I(1) I(1) 
Chad  -5.1887 [8]  -5.2010 [0]  -4.3388 [0]  -5.3479 [2]  -2.3018 [2]  -5.2010 [0]  -4.2831 [0]  -17.7210 [14]  I(0) I(1) 
Congo – B  -1.7877 [0]  -2.5085 [0]  -1.8955 [0]  -4.9257 [0]  -1.3101 [2]  -2.5085 [0]  -2.0317 [1]  -4.9259 [1]  I(1) I(2) 
Congo – K  -1.1831 [1]  -2.8639 [0]  -2.8638 [0]  -4.9272 [1]  -1.4394 [2]  -2.8665 [1]  -2.8057 [2]  -6.1437 [11]  I(1) I(1) 
Cote d’Ivoire  -2.2758 [0]  -3.0127 [4]  -2.0718 [0]  -3.5336 [2]  -2.3979   [2]  -3.2301 [2]*  -1.9044 [0]  -3.5432 [11]  I(1) I(1) 
Gabon  -3.2752 [0]  -3.8582 [0]  -2.4202 [0]  -5.0284 [0]  -3.2699 [6]  -3.6508 [8]  -2.2549 [0]  -8.1191 [27]  I(1) I(0) 
Gambia  -4.1605 [1]  -5.7087 [1]  -2.2579 [0]  -4.2894 [0]  -6.1537 [9]  -4.8015 [11]  -2.2579 [0]  -4.2015 [2]  I(1) I(0)) 
Ghana  -1.8754 [1]  -4.4618 [0]  -1.8630 [0]  -2.6873 [6]  -1.1873 [12]  -4.6649 [12]  -1.9936 [0]  -4.7737 [12]  I(1) I(1) 
Kenya  -0.6573 [2]  -3.7019 [0]  -3.7275 [0]  -5.3639 [0]  -0.3114  [4]  -2.0709 [6]  -2.8857 [0]  -11.2158 [27]  I(1) I(1) 
Lesotho -2.8658  [0]  -4.9880 [0]  -3.4747 [0]  -7.3540 [0]  -2.4876 [9]  -7.9647 [27]  -3.5671 [2]  -8.0581 [4]  I(0) I(1) 
Madagascar  -1.3381 [0]  -5.2099 [8]  -2.0905 [0]  -5.6748 [0]  -1.2336  [3]  -6.8165 [12]  -2.0313 [0]  -5.6792 [1]  I(1) I(1) 
Malawi  -3.1295 [0]  -7.3576 [0]  -1.8719 [0]  -4.8845 [0]  -3.0856  [3]  -7.8591 [7]  -2.0958 [0]  -4.8848 [1]  I(1) I(0) 
Mali  -1.6000 [0]  -2.9753 [4]  -2.1720 [0]  -5.2684 [0]  -1.7756  [1]  4.4954 [3]  -2.2393 [0]  -5.2829 [4]  I(1) I(1) 
Mauritius -4.3145  [0]  -4.8092 [7]  -2.0257 [1]  -10.7408 [0]  -2.6840 [3]  -5.1277 [0]  -4.3142 [3]  -11.2797 [3]  I(0) I(1) 
Niger -2.7040  [6]  -6.0699 [0]  -4.2683 [2]  -3.5961[7]  -2.9213 [2]  -5.9887 [1]  -2.0395 [11]  -7.5602 [27]  I(1) I(1) 
Nigeria -2.3361[6]  -3.0088 [3]  -1.9862 [0]  -4.1855 [5]  -1.7703 [4]  -5.2642 [4]  -1.9862 [0]  -4.6882 [2]  I(1) I(1) 
Rwanda  -2.1524 [0]  -5.5007 [0]  -1.5487 [0]  -5.3920 [0]  -2.1524 [0]  -5.5452 [3]  -1.4907 [3]  -5.5820 [5]  I(1) I(1) 
Senegal  -2.2430  [0]  -5.5300 [1]  -1.7291 [0]  -4.6656 [0]  -2.4108 [1]  -5.6759 [1]  -1.7291[0]  -4.6531 [2]  I(1) I(1) 
Sierra Leone  -1.5189  [0]  -6.0466[0]  -3.9530 [5]  -9.1676 [0]  -1.4289 [4]  7.1699 [10]  -3.8618 [3]  -9.9216 [2]  I(0) I(1) 
South Africa  -3.6079  [1]  -4.1566 [0]  -1.5367 [1]  -4.3777 [0]  -3.2739 [5]  -4.7488 [16]  -2.3619 [2]  -4.4057 [6]  I(1) I(0) 
Sudan  -0.6397  [0]  -3.3701 [0]  -2.5180 [0]  -5.0408 [0]  -0.9713 [1]  -3.3116 [4]  -2.0963 [12]  -8.3477 [4]  I(1) I(1) 
Swaziland  -1.7372  [0]  -5.0153 [0]  -3.8433 [0]  -9.0254 [0]  -1.8344 [1]  -5.0149 [1]  -4.0857 [3]  -9.3198 [2]  I(1) I(0) 
Togo  -3.1022  [1]  -5.5158 [0]  -2.8146 [0]  -6.8079 [0]  -2.7242 [5]  -7.4210 [8]  -2.8149 [0]  -7.2523 [6]  I(1) I(1) 
Zambia -3.9471  [0]  -5.0616 [1]  -2.4481 [0]  -5.0131 [0]  -3.7837 [5]  -12.1123 [18]  -2.5862 [1]  -5.3293 [6]  I(1) I(0) 
Zimbabwe  -1.7410  [0]  -3.7083 [0]  -6.7041 [7]  -3.5351 [0]  -2.0901 [3]  -3.4918 [4]  -1.8589 [2]  -3.3293 [10]  I(1) I(1) 
Notes: For the levels series the critical values at the 1% and 5% levels of significance are -3.6793 and -2.9677 respectively. For the first differenced series the 
corresponding critical values are -3.6892 and -2.9719. Congo-B and Congo-K refer to Democratic Republic of Congo and Republic of Congo respectively as per 
the nomenclature used in the World Bank World Tables. Lag lengths are in parenthesis.   33
Table 2: Tests for cointegration and long-run elasticities using Freedom House data 
Dependent variable             F-Test                            Granger Causality tests                                 Long-run elasticities (D-)
1 
Country  () D Y FY   ( ) Y D FD D Y ⇒  
[prob.] 
Y D ⇒  
[prob.] 

































- -  -  - 
Burkina Faso  1.5775  1.7452  _  _  -  -  -  - 




- -  -  - 
Cameroon 3.7097  2.9552  -  -  -  -  -  - 




- -  -  - 














- -  -  - 

















Gambia 1.2402  1.9368  -  -  -  -  -  - 




- -  -  - 












Lesotho 0.5594  2.2437  _  _  -  -  -  - 
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Table 2 continued: 
Dependent variable             F-Test                            Granger Causality tests                                   Long-run elasticities 
Country  () D Y FY   ( ) Y D FD D Y ⇒  
[prob.] 
Y D ⇒  
[prob.] 











Malawi  1.8992  2.3875  _  _ -  - - - 




-  - - - 
Mauritius  0.0518  1.6083  -  - -  - - - 








































-  - - - 
Sierra  Leone  2.9293  2.0139  -  - -  - - - 
South  Africa  0.9244  0.80645  _  _ -  - - - 




-  - - - 
Swaziland  2.5257  3.0359  -  -     - 




-  - - - 
Zambia 1.1613  3.3054  -  - 
 
-  - - - 




-  - - - 
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Table 2 continued: 
‘Exact’ Critical Values for Bounds Test   
k =1  90% critical value bounds  95% critical value bounds 
T  () 0 I   ( ) 1 I   ( ) 0 I   ( ) 1 I  
30 3.303  3.797  4.090  4.663 
Notes:  *(**)*** denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The t-statistics for the long-run Granger causality results and for the 
long-run elasticities are in parenthesis while the probability values for the short-run Granger causality results are in square brackets. 
1 Because the Freedom House data is scaled 1=most democratic to 7=least democratic, a negative coefficient with that dataset implies a positive relationship 
between democracy and economic growth. To make the results easier to read, and to be consistent with the Beck et al (2001) results in Table 4, D- indicates the 
sign has been changed. Thus, in the reported results, a positive coefficient means that there is a positive relationship between democracy and economic growth.  
 
2 denotes model where GDP is the dependent variable. 
3 denotes model where democracy is the dependent variable. 
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Table 3: ADF Unit Root Test using the Beck et al. (2001) dataset 
Country  ADF test  Order of Integration 
 
t Y ln   t Y ln Δ   t D ln   t D ln Δ   t Y ln   t D ln  
Benin  -1.6162 (0)   -3.8027(1)  -2.5124(0)  -4.9568(0)  I(1)  I(1) 
Botswana  -1.0219(1) -3.7272(1) 0.9818  (0) N.A  I(1)  I(1) 
Burkina  Faso  -3.1050(0) -6.0294(1) -2.2714(0) -4.6467(0) I(1)  I(1) 
Burundi  -0.9220(0) -4.0690(0) -2.2611(0)    -4.6885(0) I(1)  I(1) 
Cameroon -1.9350(1) -3.7420(0) -2.3003(2) -2.0842(1) I(1)  I(1) 
Central  Africa  -2.6149(0) -5.8948(0) -2.2250(0) -4.7913(0) I(1)  I(1) 
Chad  -2.0425(0) -4.8537(0) -2.7740(0) -4.8448(1) I(1)  I(1) 
Congo-K
a
  -0.9150(0) -2.7768(0) -3.8160(0) -6.8011(0) I(2)  I(1) 
Cote d’Ivoire
a
  -2.0092(0) -1.6572(4) -2.0766(0) -4.8141(0) I(0)  I(1) 
Gabon  -2.3544(0) -6.1655(0) -2.1719(0) -4.9029(0) I(1)  I(1) 
Gambia
a
  -5.6873(1) -7.2532(1) -1.7439(0) -4.9477(0) I(0)  I(1) 
Ghana
a
  -4.3641(7) -4.4618(0) -2.247(0)  -4.732(1)  I(0)  I(1) 
Kenya
a
  -0.8923(2) -2.8542(1) -1.5892(0) -4.8133(0) I(2)  I(1) 
Lesotho  -2.5612(0) -4.9568(0) -1.4816(0) -4.8268(1) I(1)  I(1) 
Madagascar  -1.4419(0) -4.6878(0) -2.1917(0) -1.2949(5) I(1)  I(1) 
Malawi  -3.2473(0) -6.9121(0) -2.2031(1) -3.6997(0) I(1)  I(1) 
Mali  -1.4376(0) -4.5344(4) -3.3515(0) -6.9235(0) I(1)  I(0) 
Mauritius
a
  -5.377(5)  -5.7365(0) -4.9914(0) -7.9442(0) I(0)  I(1) 
Niger  -2.1502(0) -4.0283(0) -1.9249(0) -5.1526(0) I(1)  I(1) 
Nigeria  -3.3898(3) -2.6928(3) -2.8603(0) -5.8216(0) I(1)  I(1) 
Rwanda  -2.5395(0) -5.0741(0) -1.3049(0) -5.3062(5) I(1)  I(1) 
Senegal  -2.0905(0)  -5.4529(1)  -3.9368(0)    -5.4560 (0)  I(1)  I(1) 
Sierra Leone  -1.1924(0)  4.3017(2)  -5.3493 (3)  -5.4364(3)  I(1)  I(1) 
South  Africa  -2.9084(1) -3.9989(0) -2.4337(0) -4.7958(3) I(1)  I(1) 
Sudan  (-0.2971)0 (-4.7563)0 2.1997(0)  -4.3958(0) I(1)  I(1) 
Swaziland -2.1712(0) -4.3654(0) -1.9389(0) -4.8817(0) I(1)  I(1) 
Togo  -3.1695(1) -5.1294(0) -2.2862(0) -5.1948(0) I(1)  I(1) 
Zambia  -3.5021(0) -4.9176(1) -2.0238(0) -4.8428(0) I(1)  I(1) 
Zimbabwe -3.7086(1) -4.0141(5) -4.9034(0) -.90117(0) I(0)  I(0) 
Notes: Critical Values for differenced variables are -4.4163, -3.6220 and -3.2486 and for levels variables -4.3743, -3.6032 and -3.2381 at 1%, 5% and 10 % level 
respectively. Lag lengths are in parentheses. (a) –  The Phillips-Perron test suggests income in these countries is I(1).   37
 
Table 4: Tests for cointegration and long-run elasticities using the Beck et al. (2001) dataset 
Country F-Test  Granger  Causality  Long-run  Elasticities 
  () D Y FY   ( ) Y D FD   1 t ECT −  
(t-statistics) 
D Y ⇒  
[prob.] 












- - - 









(2.7954)    
5.8934* 
(3.9174) 




- - - 




- - - 
















- - - 




- - - 
Congo-K 9.608  -  -0.8305 
(-1.5637) 
- - 0.0507 
(0.6421) 
- - 
























Gambia  0.6092  1.8224  - - - - - - 




- - - 




- - - 




- - - 
Madagascar




















(3.2807)   38
Table 4 continued: 
Country F-Test  Granger  causality  Long-run  Elasticities 
  () D Y FY   ( ) Y D FD   1 t ECT −  
(t-statistics) 
D Y ⇒  
[prob.] 












- - - 
Mali  1.1146  3.0889  - - - - - - 
Mauritius 4.1186  1.6787  -1.0000 
(none) 
- - 0.0092 
(0.9822) 
- - 














































Senegal  2.2171  1.6101  - - - - - - 



















































- - - 




- - - 




- - - 
Notes:  *(**)*** denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The t-statistics for the long-run Granger causality results and for the 
long-run elasticities are in parenthesis while the probability values for the short-run Granger causality results are in square brackets. 
1 denotes model where GDP 
is the dependent variable.
2 denotes model where democracy is the dependent variable.   39
Table 5: Summary and Comparison of the Results using the Beck et al. (2001) and Freedom House datasets 
Country  Granger Causality  Long-Run Elasticities 
 Long-Run  Short-Run 






          
Benin          




D Y ⇒   Y D ⇒    D →Y
(e) 0.60 to 1.02 
Y→D
(f) 0.12 to 0.27  
 
Y→D 5.9 to 6.00 
Burkina  Faso          
Burundi     Y D ⇒       
Cameroon   D Y ⇒        
Chad  D Y ⇒      Y →D 0.22   
Central Africa        Y D ⇒     
Congo – B  D Y ⇒      Y →D -0.81   
Congo – K      Y D ⇒       
Cote d’Ivoire  D Y ⇒   D Y ⇒       Y →D 0.40 to 0.48 
Gabon  Y D ⇒   D Y ⇒     D →Y -0.41  Y→D 0.36 to 0.40 
Gambia          
Ghana     Y D ⇒       
Kenya  D Y ⇒      Y →D -0.23 to -0.41   
Lesotho          
Madagascar   Y D ⇒       D →Y 0.08 to 0.15 
Y→D 2.18 to 3.86 
Malawi          
Mali          
Mauritius   Y D ⇒        
Niger  D Y ⇒   D Y ⇒     Y →D 0.68 to 1.57  Y→D 0.08 to 0.10 
Nigeria   D Y ⇒     D Y ⇒   D→Y -0.35  D→Y -0.37 
Y→D -1.48 
Rwanda   Y D ⇒     D →Y 1.73 to 1.95  D→Y 0.6 to 0.9 
Senegal     D Y ⇒       
Sierra Leone    Y D ⇒       D →Y -0.52 to -2.66
South Africa    Y D ⇒       D →Y 0.25 to 0.68 
Sudan          
Swaziland   Y D ⇒       D →Y 0.50 to 1.65 
Togo          
Zambia       D Y ⇒     
Zimbabwe     D Y ⇒       
Notes: 
(a)  D Y ⇒  means Granger causality runs from GDP to democracy. 
(b)  Y D ⇒  means Granger causality runs from democracy to GDP. 
To make the results easier to read and to be consistent with the Beck et al (2001) results in Table 4, D- 
indicates the sign has been changed. 
(c) The sign on the long run estimators with the Freedom House data have been changed to make the results 
correspond to those with the LIEC database. Thus, in the reported results, a positive coefficient means that 
there is a positive relationship between democracy and economic growth. 
(d)The LIEC database is scaled 1=least democratic to 7=most democratic so a positive coefficient means 
that there is a positive relationship between democracy and economic growth. 
(e) D→Y refers to long-run elasticities when GDP is the dependent variable. 
(f) Y→D refers to long-run elasticities means democracy is the dependent variable.    40
NOTES 
                                                 
1 See Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al (2001) for technical details 
regarding the computation of the F-statistic and critical values for the significance level. 
2 Formally, dynamic OLS is based on an alternative representation of the system which assumes the 
















′ ′ Χ Χ = Χ′  and the dimensions of 
1
t Χ and 
2
t Χ  are () 1 r p × −  and () 1 r× , respectively. The error processes are deemed stationary and by 
incorporating both leads and lags of 
1
t ΔΧ  and estimating the normalised cointegrating vectors, Φ , by 
OLS, one can obtain an estimator asymptotically equivalent to MLE. 
3 Formally, FMOLS involves estimating:  t t 1 0 t y μ + Χ σ′ + σ = ,  n ,..., 2 , 1 t = . Here  t y is an  ( ) 1 I  
variable and  t Χ is a ( ) 1 k×  vector of  ( ) 1 I  regressors, which are not cointegrated among themselves. 
t Χ has the following first difference stationary process:  t t λ + η = ΔΧ ,  n ,..., 3 , 2 t =  where ηis 
a  1 k× vector of drift parameters,  t λ is a  1 k× vector of  ( ) 0 I  variables. 
4 To illustrate the difference between short-run and long-run Granger causality assume that there is a long-
run equilibrium relationship between democracy and economic growth, democracy causes economic 
growth and a shock occurs that changes the level of democracy. The shock will effect the dynamic path of 
economic growth in two ways. First there is a short-run transitory impact that is captured by the beta 
parameters in equation (3). Second, there is then a further long-run impact through the error correction term 
operating to restore the long run equilibrium that is captured by the phi parameters in equation (3). This 
long-run impact is absent in the case when only the short-run causality is present. If we have only short-run 
causality a change in the level of democracy causes only a short term change in the level of economic 
growth. However if we have both short-run and long-run causality two impacts operate, the short term 
impact, and a long term impact as equilibrium between the levels of the variables is restored. 
5 There is no data for the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Beck et al (2001) dataset. 